Many organizations have an emergency plan. Many will also have continuity plans, crisis management procedures, and risk assessments. Some go to the lengths of investing heavily in exercises, audits, and compliance. On paper, they’re all set.
But here’s the question: if something major happens tomorrow, how confident are you that your organization can actually do what it says it can in its plans?
Throughout my career in emergency management, that’s been the constant refrain.
You spend a lot of time and effort on preparedness activities, and you don’t really know whether you’ve actually built the operational capability as a result. I call that the “preparedness illusion”: the idea that because you’ve done all the stuff that goes into being prepared, you’re actually prepared. The difference really does matter, especially when an organization is going through a disruption that will change its people, its systems, and its leadership.
When Compliance Becomes the Finish Line
Allow me to be absolutely clear. Plans, policies, and regulatory compliance remain all vital pieces of a good preparedness program. You need procedures in place, responsibilities defined, and expectations documented.
The issue comes when doing the activities becomes the actual gauge of success.
Consider an organization that has just updated its EOP, met its annual training requirement, and run a small tabletop. Leadership gets a report saying all the preparedness objectives have been achieved. What have they actually demonstrated? Can the team make timely decisions with incomplete information? Can key operations continue when critical systems are down? Can the organization actually work with its external partners? Has it simply shown that the required activities took place? Compliance sets an important baseline. It doesn’t, by itself, prove operational capability. A plan is proof of planning. It is not in any way proof of preparedness.
What Exercises Can Reveal
One of the most useful things about a good exercise is that it reveals the gap between what we think we can do and what we actually can do.
Look at the case of a gas pipeline operator undertaking a hazmat response exercise. They have a response plan, established notification procedures, and staff trained for their roles. As part of the exercise, a simulated comms failure is introduced, which prevents a number of key people from getting their information through normal channels.
The situation becomes even more complicated when those same people are out there trying to coordinate with external agencies while also making operational decisions.
The exercise shows that while they may have procedures in place, those procedures are predicated on assumptions about communication systems, personnel availability, and the ability to coordinate. Nothing in this scenario suggests that the organization didn’t plan. It simply shows why planning in itself won’t necessarily get you to true readiness.
I’ve found that exercises are most useful when they’re designed to test assumptions rather than simply to confirm that the procedures we already have work. The FEMA Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) strongly stresses the relationship between the exercise, capabilities, evaluation, and improvement planning. An exercise taken on its own, however, does not necessarily demonstrate preparedness.
An exercise that doesn’t force you to make a difficult decision or challenge the organization’s underlying assumptions may be no more than a reinforcement of existing confidence. The most useful exercise is often the one that exposes a hard truth.
Preparedness Is an Organizational Responsibility
Another issue is the tendency to treat preparedness as the sole responsibility of one department.
The emergency manager may put the plan together. The continuity specialist oversees recovery strategies. The risk manager looks after the risk register. Each of those functions is doing something important, yet resilience isn’t in any one of them per se. It requires all working together.
Think about a technology outage in a healthcare system. The impact is not just on the IT side. The decisions that need to be made, the staffing implications, the financial implications, compliance issues, and the customer expectations all become interwoven. You can’t just have individual departmental plans. You need the right decision-making in place, shared situational awareness, and a strong understanding of the business as a whole. Success in that scenario is predicated on that.
This is where executive leadership is key.
Preparedness can’t just be handed off and left to any single group. Execs don’t need to be emergency managers; they do need to have a good understanding of the vulnerabilities, the capabilities, and the limitations of their organization. More importantly, they need evidence that those capabilities have in fact been demonstrated.
The Difference Between Implementation and Improvement
Perhaps the clearest example of the preparedness illusion is to be found after the exercises and the actual incidents.
An organization does an exercise, identifies the weaknesses, and then produces an after-action report which contains the recommendations, the responsible party, and the proposed corrective actions. The exercise is deemed complete, yet months on, many of those same weaknesses are still there. The issue isn’t so much a lack of awareness of the problem. It’s a failure to take that awareness and do anything about it in a way that leads to real organizational improvement.
In my recent paper in Disaster Prevention and Management, I introduced the AAR Implementation Continuum, a conceptual model of the way organizations move from operational observation to institutional learning.
The framework defines seven stages: observation, finding, recommendation, assigned responsibility, implementation, verification, and institutional learning.
One key difference is the distinction between implementing the corrective action and verifying that it has improved performance. An organization may revise its protocols, provide further training, or update its emergency plan. That would be evidence that something has been done. It wouldn’t necessarily be proof that the original deficiency has been addressed. Verification requires evidence of improved performance (via subsequent exercises, capability assessments, or otherwise).
Administrative completion is not the same as operational improvement. Until organizations make that distinction, they’ll keep re-documenting the same issues and won’t be better prepared to deal with them.
Five Ways to Move Beyond the Preparedness Illusion
We must move beyond the “Preparedness Illusion”. A move from documented preparedness to demonstrated capability doesn’t necessarily mean you need a bigger budget or a completely new program. It just means you need to rethink what success looks like and how you measure it.
1. Measure capability, not just activity.
Keep tracking the plans, the training, and the exercises, but link them to operational expectations. Set measurable objectives for how quickly a crisis management team can come together, whether the critical functions can be maintained, and whether the decision-makers can get their message across during a disruption.
2. Challenge organizational assumptions.
Every preparedness plan is based on a series of assumptions about personnel, resources, technology, and external support. Exercises should be designed to test what happens when those assumptions are wrong. What if the person you’ve designated as the leader is on vacation? What if one of your primary systems doesn’t work? What if recovery takes twice as long as you’d anticipated?
3. Engage executive leadership.
Preparedness decisions are rarely just about the operational stuff. They invariably involve a number of competing demands and a limited set of resources. Senior leadership must be involved in the exercises, need to be aware of capability gaps, and need to own the decisions that impact the organization’s level of readiness.
4. Connect organizational functions.
Emergency management, business continuity, cyber security, operations, and executive leadership, to name just a few, all need to understand how their responsibilities intersect. The organization should be looking at cross-functional exercises and assessing whether the plans in place actually support the ability to make coordinated decisions.
5. Check that the improvements actually work.
Corrective actions aren’t necessarily effective just because someone says a task is complete. The organization needs a way to check that the identified gaps and weaknesses have been addressed. That could include follow-up activities, performance reviews, or evidence of change in how the process operates.
These five actions share the same aim: to move preparedness from an administrative exercise to a demonstrable organizational capability.
Readiness Must Be Demonstrated
Enterprise resilience isn’t achieved by simply ticking boxes. It’s achieved through deliberate planning, realistic testing, and honest assessment. The organizations best able to deal with disruption aren’t necessarily the ones with the most detailed plans. They’re the ones who know what they can actually do, their own limits, and are constantly working to close their identified gaps.
For execs and risk professionals, this is a key leadership responsibility. You don’t just ask whether you’ve got a plan.
- You need to ask whether the people responsible for implementing it actually understand their role.
- Ask whether the assumptions on which it is based have been tested.
- Ask whether you’ve actually repaired the weaknesses identified.
- Ask what evidence shows the organization can deliver when the going gets tough.
Preparedness isn’t a document; it’s not a checklist, it’s not an annual exercise. It’s a capability which has to be developed, demonstrated, assessed, and constantly improved. As long as we don’t make that distinction, we’ll be left with the false impression that we’re prepared just because we’ve got a document on the shelf or have done an exercise.
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References
Federal Emergency Management Agency. (2020). Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP). U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
Hicks, T. (2026). Beyond the report: The AAR Implementation Continuum as a framework for institutional learning in disaster management. Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal. https://doi.org/10.1108/DPM-04-2026-0188
National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2010). Contingency planning guide for federal information systems (NIST Special Publication 800-34, Revision 1). https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-34r1
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